We Can’t Represent the Idea of Representation
Even if art inspires imitation
The late Robert Germany published Mimetic Contagion: Art and Artifice in Terence’s Eunuch several years ago. One section that drew my interest is Chapter 3, “Lifelike Likeness: Mimetic Contagion in the Philosophical Tradition.”
“The Greek word mimēsis is plainly connected to the word mimos,” he says, the latter referring to “lowbrow theatrical entertainment” as well as “the actor who plays in such a show.”
What he means by “mimetic contagion” is a particular kind of power in art. An artwork has an “ability to generate likeness in the viewer”; that is, it looks real (i.e. it resembles something that exists or could exist in the world), and it inspires people to try to interact with it and eventually to reproduce the image or otherwise imitate the idea in their lives.
Furthermore, people copy the copy, and the power persists in these copies, be they second- or third-generation or beyond. These copies begin to remind us of the idea of representation. We can think not only about how to create and enjoy a particular piece of art, but about art itself. “When what they see and imitate is itself a work of mimetic art,” Germany says, “their behaviour serves as an icon not only of the object they see, but of the unrepresentable mode of existence of…
