I understand that "game theory" and "social contract theory"--specifically in the context of understanding morality, as you discuss them in your article--have to do with rational selfishness. Do you therefore see them as as primarily assuming consequentialism (i.e. one should predict and calculate benefits and losses), as opposed to a deontological (i.e. one should obey other sorts of rules or obligations) or virtue ethics (i.e. one should be kind, brave, patient, etc.)? I could look up what the game theorists have said, and I'm not asking you to do that basic research for me; I'm just curious how you are interpreting it.

It occurs to me that "game theory"/"social contract theory" might be a fourth option alongside consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics...unless they presuppose consequentialism or are only compatible with consequentialism.

I like your proposal of "a prior question of value: What should we be doing?" It seems that such a question should underlie those other metaethical options, too.